> Enjoy....again, this is with Frank's permisson....malinda > > Frank Pierce Young wrote: > > > American Privateers in the War of 1812 (1 of 2) > > > > When on 18 June 1812 the U.S. Congress declared war upon the United Kingdom > > of Great Britain & Ireland, etc., a weak new nation grabbed the Lion by its > > tail. The U.S. War Department was an incompetent political mess and its > > little army of 6,700 little better, when Great Britain could move thousands > > of crack troops as it pleased. (And it did; though logistically limited > > essentially to raid-and-run, the bumblefooted U.S. Army did not exactly cover > > itself with laurels during the war.) The Navy Department was a very different > > matter -- but its forces very small. At war's outbreak, the USN had nine > > frigates and eight smaller vessels on hand; the Royal Navy had 1,048 vessels > > of all types. Very poor odds. > > > > Worse: though years-long RN stopping of American merchantmen for real or > > alleged attempts to get cargoes into Napoleonic France and French-controlled > > areas, and RN impressment (even from a warship) of real or alleged British > > seamen from them infuriated Americans and became political mantras -- "Free > > Trade & Sailors Rights" came to appear even on flags -- the nation was > > nonetheless divided. The small but busy New England states, whose very > > considerable shipping earlier got shut down by a Presidential embargo, and > > then later bear by far the bulk of the risks, confiscations, manpower takings > > and trade losses from RN searches and seizures, not to mention the dark value > > of insults, were not in favour of war with Britain. The push for that came > > from the mid-Atlantic states and those of the south. > > > > All logic made war foolish. In fact, had a telephone existed at the time, war > > might not have occurred at all. On 16 June, Mr. Brougham, MP moved in > > Parliament for an address to the Prince Regent, beseeching him to recall or > > suspend all related Orders and adopt such measures as might conciliate > > neutral Powers without sacrificing the dignities of the Crown, withdrawn when > > Lord Castlereagh announced that the government was about to make just such a > > conciliatory move directly to America. It was too late. In the U.S., the > > declaration of war two days later doused New England's reluctance, and > > sparked a remarkable patriotic upsurge everywhere. > > > > A contemporary historian of English history notes that "Compared to the war > > in the peninsula [Spain and Portugal], the war with the United States was > > regarded by the people of England as an affair of inferior importance [though > > Americans] obtained some successes at sea ..." Indeed. What the tiny U.S. > > Navy managed to do against the vaunted RN in the first few months of the war, > > before it was mostly blockaded, is well known; suffice that it stunned the > > Royal Navy and utterly shocked Parliament. The nose-bloodied RN got sailing > > orders in heaps: shut down all American ports; blockade their merchantmen, > > kill their trade, lock up those infernal Yankee warships. But more was > > already going on in American ports, ad hoc, driven by that most sparkly of > > inducements -- the gleaming prospect of Big Money, there for the easy > > taking. > > > > When news of war came, the merchants of Salem, Massachusetts, promptly began > > financing their own little private warships. On 27 July their letter to the > > Secretary of the Navy advised that eight were armed and crewed within ten > > days of the war news, three more in a "state of forwardness, one of which > > will sail this day, and a number of others preparing. The number of prizes > > already sent in amount to sixteen sail, and a number more are known to be > > captured." Then they asked for two gunboats for harbour protection. More of > > the same was going on in Baltimore and Norfolk, where fitting out privateers > > became an overnight fury of activity, the latter sending out its first on 20 > > July, with crowds cheering from shore. > > > > >From war's outbreak through the rest of 1812, British merchantmen were taken > > by the score, nay the hundred, by Americans; the London TIMES asking, "Good > > God! Can such things be?", and the weekly PILOT stating that Lloyd's List had > > posted notices of "...upward of five hundred British vessels captured in > > seven months ... Five hundred merchantmen and three frigates! Can these > > statements be true? Anyone who had predicted such a result of an American war > > this time last year would have been treated as a madman or a traitor ..." > > > > Over that period, U.S. Navy warships ESSEX took 11 merchantmen, CONSTITUTION > > nine, PRESIDENT seven, and little ARGUS six; some others took fewer. Given > > the enormous size of the British merchant marine, these naval captures were > > picayune. The too-real floating fright was American privateers. > > > > Within weeks they were a veritable infestation, and would become more so. A > > coterie of merchants of the West Indies petitioned Parliament that they had > > already lost "... 200 sail of British merchantmen and three or four packets > > .. .so daring as to cut vessels out of harbours, though protected by > > batteries, and to land to carry off cattle. Jamaica is blockaded by > > privateers ..." In Parliament during debate on this problem, Lord Lansdowne > > said, "I am almost ashamed to mention .. what had been the services of our > > own navy..." > > > > The year 1813 saw full British port blockade in force, and American land > > affairs at best in doldrums. Not so at sea. Back on 5 October of '12 British > > Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren wrote the Secretary of Admiralty from Halifax > > about "..the demand of Ships for Convoys and the protection of Commerce, the > > State of War which seems to assume a new as well as more active and > > inveterate aspect than heretofore ... the Enemy's Cruizers being very active > > and perservering which by the accompany Copy of a Commission found on the > > Prize Master of a ship recaptured by the SAN DOMINGO will be seen already to > > amount to three hundred and eighteen ... the necessity of re-inforcing the > > Squadron on this Coast and in the West Indies, to enable me to meet the > > exertions of the Enemy, who seem determined to persevere in the annoyance and > > destruction of the Commerce of Great Britain and these Provinces. I have the > > honour to be, Sir, &c ..." > > > > Privateer licence no. 318, and this capture was almost an anomaly. Warren > > sailed south to the Indies to check out the merchants' stories, and saw > > privateers daily in the distance all the way down. Meanwhile, Warren wrote, > > "The Swarms of Privateers and the Crews of several having landed at points on > > the coast of Nova Scotia and in the Leeward Islands, and cut out of the > > harbours some Vessels, render it too necessary immediately to send out a > > strong addition of ships or the Trade must inevitably Suffer, if not be, > > utterly ruined and destroyed." > > > > He already had 100 warships on blockade and chase duty, and the first part > > was solid. Chasing was the problem. It took fairly large vessels to remain on > > station for lengths of time -- that meant frigates, which as the late Lord > > Nelson had glumly noted were always in short supply. And while frigates' guns > > could overawe fat merchantmen and keep in warships trying to get out, doing > > so required watchfulness around the clock, and people got weary, and darkness > > came daily, and weather could bring rain or fog -- and in the relative blink > > of a few eyes, another fast privateer, and often two or three, were out and > > gone. And if the blockader tried going after them, they would split up and > > force choices; meantime, the moment any blockading warship moved away, still > > more privateers sleeked out. As time went on, they tended to work in pairs. > > > > (End pt. 1 of 2) To subscribe, change options, or unsubscribe please see the instructions at http://listlva.lib.va.us/archives/va-roots.html