Paul Finkelman's argument is that even if secession was a constitutional right, it was not legitimate to invoke it in 1860-61 because he does not approve of the reasons for its invocation then, which he describes as disapproval of the outcome of the 1860 election. My point had not been that secession was justified in 1860, but that the Virginia Federalists' explanation of the Constitution was authoritative in regard to its meaning for Virginia. I also noted that, as I explain in _The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Constitution_, Governor Edmund Randolph's promise that the new government would only have the powers it was "expressly delegated" echoed the assertions of leading Federalists (Wilson, Cushing, Pinckney, and Hamilton) in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and New York, and George Nicholas's assurance that secession would be an option was echoed by his fellow Federalists in New York and Rhode Island. As to secession in 1860, two points: 1) Virginia did not secede because of the outcome of the 1860 election. Its secession convention considered the proposal to do that, and refused the proposal. Virginia's secession came later, in the wake of unconstitutional acts of the Lincoln Administration. 2) It does not matter why the Virginians decided to secede. We do not say, "The right to counsel is a good right, but O.J. was a murderer, so we'll burn his house down if he tries to invoke it" or "The right to privacy is good, unless you want to invoke it to shield your medical decisions." In short, only in regard to the right to secession do opponents of invocation of the right point to the motives of those who invoke it in weighing the right's legitimacy. My analysis is that most people who find themselves invoking rights do so for unsavory reasons (to get away with murdering an ex-wife, say, as in O.J.'s case), and that's what we should expect; after all, it's the political/moral minority that has to fall back on rights talk. I have recently been branded a "neo-Confederate" for making this argument by a prominent Straussian magazine. This seems to me rather akin to being branded pro-ex-wife-murder for defending O.J.'s right to counsel. Kevin Gutzman I said I would bow out and I will, but I want to make two points. First, I would like Kevin to show me one place in this discussion where I suggested that the Constitution of 1787 created an "unlimited" central government. Since he has (I assume) read my book Slavery and the Founders, he knows that I have long argued that the Central Government had no power to end slavery where it existed, and since slavery was the key issue of the era, that point alone should suffice to illustrate that I am not arguing the constitution of 1787 or even the constitution of today created such a regime. Again, take a look at my articles on states rights in the antebellum period and the use of separate and independent state grounds for civil liberties in the modern period. Arguing that there is not right to secession does not lead to the conclusion the central government had unlimited powers. To argue secession was illegal does not imply an "unlimited federal government." The two are not the same at all. My point is that there is nothing to justify secession in 1860. The South had effectively won every presidential election by two since 1788. (the two adams administrations); the had controlled the Supreme Court for all but a handful of years; and had also controlled the House and Senate more often than not. Lincoln won and suddenly the cry babies wanted to take their football and go home because they had lost an election. If Losing the election is not grounds for revolution. Since the Constitution does not have a clause allowing a unilateral withdrawal, there is not way to leave short of statute or amendment. The South might have gone to the Congress in Dec. 1860 and asked for a statute allowing the states to leave. Buchanan would surely have signed such a law and Taney would have upheld it. Even if someone you can construe the Va. signing statement (that IS what it is) to allow for withdrawl, there had to be a reason other than "we don't like the result of the election." Calling for troops to suppress the unwarranted firing on a federal fort was emphatically not an attack on Va. The offer of President Lincoln to put a Virginian in charge of the army (to replace the Virginian -- Scott -- who was already in charge of the Army) underscores that even by the standards of the Va. signing statement, Va had no legal or legitimate reason to pull out. Paul Finkelman President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy Albany Law School 80 New Scotland Avenue Albany, New York 12208-3494 ______________________________________ To subscribe, change options, or unsubscribe please see the instructions at http://listlva.lib.va.us/archives/va-hist.html