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From:
Tom Magnuson <[log in to unmask]>
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Date:
Mon, 11 Jun 2007 10:52:16 -0400
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"Asymmetry" and "unconventional" as well as "professional" are all 
fairly technical terms.  In the case of the last, by definition, there 
were "long service regulars" but no professionals in the US Army until 
after the Civil War when Emory Upton reported on professionalism in 
European armies.  West Point was a civil engineering school and produced 
good technicians but not professionals in the modern meaning of the word 
as there was no US military "doctrine" (another very technical term) to 
protect and convey but rather just borrowed how-to books from European 
authorities.

Asserting that victory derived from major field engagements is a bold 
statement but no more supportable than declaring that victory derived 
from militia cadres continually operating in low intensity (another very 
technical term) environments all over the back countries of England's 
colonies.  An observable fact is that when the British moved away from 
the Atlantic coast, their main bases of operations, they regularly got 
in serious trouble.  Such is the case with most maritime powers in most 
times.

Washington and his "family" tended to blame militia for their failures.  
Washington had a long history of failure with militia dating back to the 
F&I war.  Apparently he had difficulty overcoming his own cavalier 
prejudices about the lower orders and he passed that disdain on to his 
subordinates.  At Cowpens, Morgan used his continentals as the anvil and 
his cavalry and militia as his hammers.  The British broke against the 
anvil when struck by the hammers on their flanks.  The continentals did 
what regular cannon fodder is taught to do, they stood and took it, but 
receiving a blow is not the same as breaking the enemy.  Until the final 
melee, attacking was done by cavalry and militia flanking the enemy.

Lee's abuse of Pickett's excellent militia at Clapps and Weitzels cost 
Greene his best militia force just days before Guilford Courthouse where 
Cornwallis demonstrated how to use cannon fodder.  A militiaman could 
not have discharged cannon into his own formation (as Cornwallis did 
that day) and have expected to survive the exercise.  Arguable, 
Cornwallis didn't survive doing so either as his troops never again in 
the American campaigns allowed him to get behind them with artillery.  
Lee spent the balance of his days explaining away his abuse of militia 
and prisoners.  He is, arguably, America's Tarleton.

trm

James Brothers wrote:

> I'm well aware that the force at Bunker (Breed's) Hill was not  
> Continental Line, but my point had two parts. It was asserted that   
> much, if not most, of the credit for the American victory in the  
> Revolution was due to asymmetrical warfare. It was with this that my  
> comments were primarily concerned. While asymmetrical warfare  
> contributed to the American victory, it was not the  primary cause.  
> The American victory in the war was the result of winning major field  
> engagements (Saratoga, Yorktown, Bunker Hill, ...), or as in the case  
> of Gen. Greene's Southern Campaign causing the British to win pyrric  
> ones. Francis Marion et al could have harassed the British for  
> decades and it would not have won the war.
>
> As to whether or not the US had a professional army until the middle  
> of the 19C, I suppose that is a matter of opinion. Militia had short  
> terms of enlistment (usually measured in months). This usually  
> resulted in their participation in one battle. They also had little  
> or no training. The "professionals" had longer enlistments, did  
> receive training (von Steuben comes to mind), and fought in entire  
> campaigns. And while it is the case that many of the accounts of the  
> war were not written by members of the militia (officers or men),  
> some were. It is also true that there were officers who grossly  
> exaggerated their roles and successes. But there had to have been a  
> few honest ones. Just because they wore uniforms does not require  
> that they were poltroons, cads, liars, etc., etc.
>
> Unless the understanding of Cowpens has substantially changed in the  
> last few years, while the militia had a role in the victory, it was  
> the "professionals" who broke the British.
>
> As a Lee, albeit a Western one, I'll grant that Light Horse Harry had  
> at best a checkered career/reputation. I would have kept my hand on  
> my wallet when in his vicinity ;-))
>
> James Brothers, RPA
> [log in to unmask]
>
>
>
> On Jun 8, 2007, at 10:06, qvarizona wrote:
>
>> While I don't  disagree with you regarding the Continental Line,   
>> may I  point out that its officers were the ones who wrote the bulk  
>> of reports and since many --Light Horse Harry comes to mind-- were  
>> known scoffers of the militia, their reports were not always  
>> accurate and tended to downplay any militia participation,  
>> particularly if it infringed on their own accounts of glory.   Here's 
>> one example of many:
>>
>> The battle in early 1781 near Guilford Courthouse:  Regarding the  
>> end of that battle, Odell McGuire, wrote in  his acclaimed  "Many  
>> Were Sore Chased And Some Cut Down",
>>
>> ". . . Tarleton's legion, [British troops] reinforced by 200  redcoat 
>> infantry,
>>  were finally met and there was a sharp fight. Graham's North  
>> Carolinians
>> refused to dismount and take their place with the  other riflemen.  
>> Nor could
>> Lee's cavalry do much in the thickets, but his Legion infantry and  
>> the Botetourts
>> [Rowland's 200 militia] quickly formed and returned fire. The  losses 
>> after fifteen
>> minutes were about twenty or thirty on each side. At this point  
>> [Colonel]
>> Otho Williams, instead of bringing up his much superior reserve,  
>> 'order'd a
>> gradual retreat which was well enough effected considering the  
>> irregularity of our order.'"
>>
>> Following  Otho William's order,  Lee's Legion retreated, leaving  
>> the "back
>> woodsmen" militiamen trying to hold off the British alone to cover  
>> the retreat.   McGuire continues,
>>
>> "That the riflemen didn't take part in the ordered retreat and that  
>> the Legion
>> was pulled out, leaving them behind, could not have been gathered  
>> from Williams' report to his commanding General.  But Nathanael  
>> Greene, not altogether without guile himself, was too shrewd a  
>> commander  to let he equivocal phrase,
>>  'considering the irregularity of our order', slip past without  
>> finding out  exactly
>> what was meant. "
>>
>> In later reports,  Lee omits any mention of his own retreat -- 
>> successful due to the protection provided by Rowland's riflemen--   
>> and instead  attacks
>> the actions of the Botetourt militia during all of the North  
>> Carolina Expedition.  In addition, he was the cause of many  Virginia 
>> militiamen being charged with desertion from which  they  were 
>> cleared during a court martial in March. . . but that's  another story.
>>
>> By the way, the American force at Bunker/Breed Hill --which lost  
>> against a far superior force-- were made up in large part by  farm  
>> boys --members of militia groups from all over New England who  
>> enlisted following the action at Concord and Lexington.  The  outcome 
>> at Cowpens  also depended on  militiamen (Gilmore's Rifles  
>> Rockbridge Co. VA. ) I'm not so sure the Continentals could have  
>> held up without them.
>>
>> Joanne
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> James Brothers <[log in to unmask]> wrote: While there are instances  of 
>> asymmetrical warfare (king's Mountain
>> comes to mind) during the American Revolution, they contributed to
>> victory but did not win the war. It was the pitched battles such as
>> Bunker's Hill, Saratoga, Cowpens, Yorktown, etc. that determined the
>> final outcome. And it was not the militia, but the Continental Line
>> that won those battles.
>>
>> James Brothers, RPA
>> [log in to unmask]
>>
>>
>>
>> On Jun 7, 2007, at 9:16, Debra Jackson/Harold Forsythe wrote:
>>
>>> Paul has received some rather unfair criticism about his
>>> understanding of the US military in US history.  Paul knows this
>>> history in detail but let me "speak" for him for a minute.
>>>
>>> The US militia and "professional" military during the Revolution
>>> was a rather thrown together force.  They prevailed, but for
>>> reasons that seem almost miraculous.  It helped that Americans
>>> often fought asymmetrically from Concord on out.  It also helped
>>> that the field of battle was so large that the British military,
>>> itself without a draft, didn't have enough troops to completely
>>> occupy the 13 Colonies/united States.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ---------------------------------
>> The fish are biting.
>>  Get more visitors on your site using Yahoo! Search Marketing.
>
>

-- 

T.R. Magnuson

Trading Path Association

PO Box 643

Hillsborough, NC  27278

919-644-0600

www.tradingpath.org

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