On Wed, 15 Aug 2001 23:04:26 EDT, [log in to unmask] wrote:

>To the roster of "Virginia" units fighting in the South might be added Col.
>William Washington's dragoons and Harry Lee's Legion which were filled out
by
>regulars from other states as well as Virgininians - Lee in particular with
>Delaware Continentals. Neither were at Charleston.
>
>The fall of Charleston was arguably the greatest military disaster suffered
>by the Americans during the war. Not only were both the Virginia and North
>Carolina Continental Lines eliminated as organizations, growing anti-war
>sentiment in England was blunted by the news of this major British victory.
>It is interesting that it was the much maligned militia the filled much of
>the gap and consumed so much of Cornwallis' valuable effort, men, supplies,
>and time. (Along with a collection of "regular" Continental troops
including
>the under appreciated Maryland Continentals.)
>
>Bill Russell
>
>To subscribe, change options, or unsubscribe, please see the instructions
>at http://listlva.lib.va.us/archives/va-hist.html

With regard to the post about the Virginia troops in the South during the
Revolution, I would not at all agree that Maryland's Continentals have been
ignored or underapreciated.  As is well known, these troops (originally
sent south by George Washington under the command of Baron de Kalb in Apr
1780) served at Camden, Cowpens, Guilford C.H. and numerous other small
actions as well. While the avg reader may be unaware of Maryland's role in
the South, historians over the years certainlyhave not ignored their role.
See Christopher Ward's "The Delaware Continentals" and Larry Babits' "A
Devil of a Whipping."  As far as interpretations of the militia in the
South (from all southern states, incl Va.) I have researched this issue in
depth, and have heard all manner of opinions ranging from poor to
excellent.  My conclusion is that these units served a valuable purpose for
the Patriot war effort, though in a very limited, narrow way.  One need
only look at the Virginians at Camden to understand that the greatest
mistake commanders could make was to use militia in the same fashion as
regulars.  Dan Morgan at Cowpens was the most successfull at using militia,
because he understood that these men would not act like Continentals and he
did not use them as such.  To imply, as [log in to unmask] does, that the
militia companies "consumed so much of Cornwallis' valuable effort, men,
supplies,and time" with only assiatnce from the regulars is a
misinterpretation of the actual events.  It cannot be reasonably held as he
or she does that the militia were the primary opponents of Cornwallis with
the assistance of Continentals; the opposite is true.

John Maass
UNC-Greensboro

To subscribe, change options, or unsubscribe, please see the instructions
at http://listlva.lib.va.us/archives/va-hist.html