Eric Richardson writes:  "As to inclusion in the stratum of human society, women were property regardless of ethnicity during the same period and coming from English tradition, there were questions as to whether they had souls.  John Donne, Shakespeare, And Milton all hold a similar viewpoint about women."

I'd like to see these claims warranted somehow in sources.  I can say with complete confidence, based on study of Church of England theology, that no Anglican, in Virginia or in Great Britain, at any time tried to defend the claim that only men had souls.  The broader notion that Christian faith more broadly denied the existence of souls in women is something of a canard, and derives from various relatively obscure debates during the reformation (over the proper translation of the latin "homo" for example).  I don't know the theology of protestant dissent anywhere near so well as I do that of the Church of England, but I'd be very surprised indeed if Baptist or Presbyterian ministers at any point attempted to argue that women did not have souls.  Perhaps Charles Irons or John Ragosta, or someone similarly knowledgeable in these sources can comment?

I am also uncomfortable with the blanket assertion that "women were property" under 17th or 18th century Virginia law.  It certainly is the case that the legal doctrine of coverture operated in British Colonial Virginia, and that this doctrine was debilitating to the status of women.  But there were important distinctions between the dependent status of women and that of enslaved persons.  For one thing, enslaved persons, as property, could be alienated--they could be bought and sold.  For another, Virginia law released masters of slaves from the sanctions applied against men or women who perpetuated the various legal categories of violence against other persons.  In other words, a master who killed his slave was not guilty of murder; and a master who physically attacked his slave was not guilty of assault or battery.  But in Virginia law, a husband who killed his wife, or a father who killed his daughter, or a son who killed his mother, *could* be found guilty of murder.  Similarly, a husband who beat his wife, mother, or daughter could, under certain conditions, be found guilty of assault or battery.  These strike me as important distinctions.

Generally speaking, scholars who try to document evolving status of dependency and supremacy, of hierarchy, or of oppression and exploitation, draw a distinction in their work between the operation of slavery, and the various institutional dependencies to which women were subject.  Thus, for example Chris Tomlins, in his brilliant (if unnecessarily difficult and over-written) study FREEDOM BOUND, treats slavery in one chapter, and dependencies of gender in another.  He does this because they are not the same thing--they had different logics to them, both legal and social, and hence should be treated as analytically distinct categories.

All best,
Kevin
___________________________
Kevin R. Hardwick
Associate Professor
Department of History, MSC 8001
James Madison University
Harrisonburg, Virginia 22807
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